Explaining The Hard Problem
The "hard problem of consciousness" was coined by philosopher and cognitive scientist David Chalmers in 1994. It describes the difficulty of explaining how our first person subjective experience arises from physical processes. We can define subjective experience as "what it's like to be something". For most people, this consists of the perspective that we exist in the space inside our head and observe the world outside of us with our five senses. Additionally, we have thoughts, and thoughts about our thoughts. We also have memory, a sense of self and emotions. These individual, subjective and conscious experiences of the world are called qualia.
The challenge with any theory in explaining the hard problem is that our experience is subjective, meaning that we only truly ever have access to own our perspective. Modern science operates on the principle of objective observation: not only must the results of an experiment be repeatable by others, but the methods themselves must be transparent and verifiable — so that any observer can replicate the experiment and arrive at the same conclusion. There is a great irony that consciousness is both the one thing we can be most certain about, because we experience the world through it, and also the one thing that may lie outside the scientific method, as no one else can experience our consciousness.
The exploration of consciousness now touches a very broad array of fields such as neuroscience, physics, ethics, artificial intelligence, psychology and philosophy, and profoundly influences our understanding of reality, the nature of God, and our sense of purpose. The exploration below is not meant to be exhaustive but simply to give an introduction to the problem and my assessment of possible solutions.
Exploring Previous Thought
There has been no shortage of theories of consciousness in the last few decades and subtle distinctions between theories has led to a large number of unique perspectives on the problem. Although the differences between individual theories are important, it can still be helpful to group the leading theories into major branches, which consists of dualism, physicalism, panpsychism, and idealism.
- Dualism - the claim that there are two radically distinct parts: a physical brain and a nonphysical substance that is independent of the brain
- Physicalism - the claim that consciousness is entirely physical and the product of biological brains
- Panpsychism - the claim that phenomenal consciousness exists because everything has an inherent "proto-consciousness", even atomic particles
- Idealism - the claim that mind is the ultimate reality and everything is derived from it
Below are brief descriptions of a few selected theories meant to give a general landscape of the thought of consciousness. These are not comprehensive as there are hundreds of theories of consciousness, with many of them constantly being updated for new observations, experiments and ideas.
Dualism
Dualism is famously associated with Rene Descartes, a 17th-century philosopher, mathematician, and scientist. His theory, referred to now as Cartesian dualism, posits that the mind and body are two distinct substances.1 Specifically, in this view the soul is a real, immaterial substance that is distinct from the physical body, which implies that there is a physical world and a non-physical world, commonly interpreted as spiritual. This was the dominant view on consciousness from the 17th to 19th centuries, but was largely replaced by materialism/physicalism in the 20th century.
While David Chalmers supports a view he calls naturalist dualism, it fits better under the panpsychist umbrella as it claims that matter has both physical and non-physical properties.
Physicalism
This branch encompasses the most theories, each with a different proposal of how subjective experience emerges from physical properties.
One of the most well-known physicalist theories is called global workspace theory (GWT), first introduced by cognitive scientist Bernard Baars. This view theorizes that information in the brain becomes conscious when it is available globally, to many different parts of the brain, rather than just locally.2 The concept here is that many brain processes can happen subconsciously, like control of breathing or automatic tasks, but consciousness happens when information is shared across the network of brain regions.
Neuroscientist Anil Seth's beast machine theory proposes that perception is a controlled hallucination constructed by the brain. In this view, the brain is a prediction machine that is constantly generating best guesses about the world and the sensory signals it receives help it "correct" its prediction. The sense of self is another hallucination that is critical in keeping the body alive.3
Philosopher Daniel Dennett had proposed a "Multiple Drafts" model of consciousness which implied that the brain is a decentralized computer and that information states are not one unified locus of conscious experience but more like multiple drafts of an article being edited by different parts of the brain in real time.4 In this view, conscious experience happens when one thought "wins" against other competing thoughts, making it available to memory. He also embraced illusionism, the idea that subjective experience and qualia don't actually exist but just seem to because the illusion of a unified self was helpful from an evolutionary point of view.
Panpsychism
Pan-agentialism is a view championed by Philosopher Philip Goff. He proposes that even particles have the capacity for rational responsiveness, and that when combined with experiential understanding, like when particles are arranged in more complex ways like a brain, then agency emerges.5 This is consistent with the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) which states that a system becomes conscious when there is more integrated information in the system as a whole than there is in the parts.6 While there are several versions of panpsychist theories, most share the core idea of Russelian monism, that matter has intrinsic experience.
Idealism
Philosopher and theologian David Bentley Hart holds a position of classical idealism which traces its roots back to ancient Greece. Hart's claim is that infinite mind is the ground of all things and that matter emanates from mind almost like the expression of thought.7 He argues that subjective experience and intentionality are irreducible realities that no physical description can capture. This is because mind is the intrinsic, purposive, and self-organizing principle of all living nature and ultimately because mind, being and unity all arise from a single, infinite, spiritual source - God.
Bernardo Kastrup's analytic idealism also claims that consciousness is fundamental but attributes this to a non-deliberative universal consciousness as opposed to a being like God.8
Conscious realism is a view developed by cognitive psychologist Donald Hoffman and others that proposes that reality consists of conscious agents and that what we consider "reality" emerges from the dynamics between conscious agents.9 A foundational claim is that organisms don't perceive the world accurately but that evolution tunes perception to fitness. This implies that we don't perceive true reality but see the world through a "headset" optimized to help us survive. The details of how conscious agents interact by serving as each other's outer world can get conceptually complex and include an elaborate set of rules around mapping experiences, decisions and actions mathematically. He has a mathematical framework that he hopes can be used to derive fundamental physics, and if successful, could imply that consciousness is fundamental and matter emerges from it.
Employing Method
Empirical Testability
As mentioned above, consciousness presents a unique challenge to the scientific method because it is a first-person experience, while science rests on principles of verifiability and reproducibility, both of which require objectivity. Ultimately, we must begin with our own conscious experience. Whether or not we are living in a simulation, or whether our perceptions don't reflect true reality, I am certain that I am conscious and this is the starting point from which all further understanding must be built.
This realization undermines the argument for illusionism, the view that consciousness is an illusion. In The Mystery of Consciousness, John Searle writes "The distinction between appearance and reality... does not apply to the very existence of conscious states, because in such cases the appearance is the reality".10 If I can know I am conscious, then consciousness cannot be an illusion- because the appearance is not just an illusion - it is the reality.
If we accept that our first person experience reflects effective reality, then we can reasonably trust that scientific measurements are also real and describe our collective, shared reality. This allows us to use science to look at consciousness from the outside. Most theories in the physicalist group attempt to do just this - to use scientific observation to map consciousness to brain activity, and to explain how - and why - subjective experience arises from physical systems. These theories offer testable predictions and increasingly precise correlations between neural patterns and conscious states.
Yet, as Hart writes in All Things Are Full of Gods: "No matter how sophisticated the cognitive sciences may become, mere quantitative advances in physical data will never be able to span the qualitative abyss between the objective and subjective dimensions of reality."11 This suggests that, to many, the hard problem of consciousness is a gap between physical processes and subjective experience that can never be closed from the physicalist perspective.
Dualism, panpsychism, and idealism can all be structured to agree with physicalism on observable data and also make few, if any, physical predictions. This makes them difficult, if not impossible to verify empirically. When new empirical data surface, these theories can typically be adapted to accommodate them. Of the three, dualism may face unique difficulties in explaining certain phenomena, with one example being a corpus callosotomy. This is a severing of the left and right hemispheres of the brain, which is used as a last resort treatment for epilepsy.12 In these cases there seems to be evidence that the left and right brains have different experiences, and some could argue, different consciousnesses. Panpsychists and idealists likely argue that the severing simply creates two distinct consciousness or something in between one cohesive consciousness and two separate ones, but dualism has difficulty explaining how the soul is still attached to either hemisphere as it is supposed to be simple and indivisible.
Logical Coherence
We can assess each group of theories based on logic and reason. Idealism and panpsychism both face what's called the "combination problem". For panpsychism, this is the difficulty of explaining how consciousness at the particle level can be combined into consciousness at higher levels of complexity, like a human brain, and how the boundaries of one consciousness are defined. While there are several flavors of panpsychism, the explanations seem to primarily consist of relabeling the mystery and establishing unintuitive rules for combination, such as claiming consciousness is a fusion of lower "minds" or that consciousness is a higher-level dependent effect produced in addition to the combined "minds", both of which seem incoherent.13 Similarly, while Hoffman's framework for conscious realism includes a mathematical formalism for how agents combine into more complex agents, it may run into the same problem as panpsychist theories do.
For classical idealism, the same difficulty exists, but from the top down - how can one infinite mind be decomposed into several minds, each with their own experience? Hart describes individual consciousnesses or finite minds as radiations of infinite mind, similar to how light can be split into distinct colors with a prism, and adds that every act of knowing presupposes an infinite horizon of intelligibility - that we have rationality, intentionality, purposiveness and knowledge because our consciousness emanates from a God with those characteristics.14 While a beautiful metaphor, the explanation lacks specifics and is therefore difficult to assess logically.
Intuitive Appeal
A useful thought experiment in regards to consciousness is the philosophical zombies concept, which asks the question, can you imagine a zombie human that is indistinguishable from a conscious human, in that they receive data from all five senses, they can reason and speak like a human, and make decisions like a human, but they don't have an inner, conscious experience?15
If so, this would imply that consciousness is not necessary for human cognition and functioning, which creates a difficulty for the physicalist theories in explaining why we have consciousness. Most physicalists above would likely reject the premise and would argue the zombie is conscious because it has all the physical processes necessary. Interestingly, the panpsychists and idealists would likely argue that the concept is at least conceivable and view this as a significant difficulty for physicalist explanations, but ultimately concede that what truly makes a human conscious is either the experience inherent in the particles themselves or the intentionality infused from infinite mind.
The zombies thought experiment highlights the major weakness of physicalist theories - intuitiveness. While they provide increasingly convincing arguments for why we have consciousness from an evolutionary point of view, it is difficult to imagine how a first-person experience of the world emerges from atoms. For many, the strength of the panpsychist and idealist theories is their appeal to something more fundamental. For me personally, while the experience-is-fundamental concept from panpsychism elegantly answers the hard problem, it is also not intuitive. I find it very difficult to imagine how elementary particles can have experience.
The only group of theories that truly feels intuitive to me is idealism. I recognize this intuition may be heavily influenced by the dualistic and theistic ideas that have pervaded Western thought. Before the development of modern science, the unexplainable could be attributed to gods and a reality deeper than what we perceive. The success of science has changed how we approach fundamental reality and has shown many times that nature is often unintuitive at first glance.
Conclusion
It's apparent why the hard problem is so hard. The leading theories all have challenges. The physicalist theories have the difficulty of explaining how something like experience can emerge from material, which to the human mind is highly unintuitive. The panpsychist and idealist theories have elegant solutions for explaining experience, but both introduce the combination problem and are difficult to verify empirically. It seems one has to choose between empiricism and intuition. However, I think there are some perspectives that are clearly less explanatory and less intuitive than others and can probably be ruled out. Traditional Cartesian dualism was once very popular but now has the least satisfactory explanation of physical phenomena and seems to be eclipsed by all of the other branches. Illusionism claims we don't actually have consciousness, but our current conscious experience is really the only thing we can be sure of. While panpsychism's premise that everything innately has experience innovatively solves the hard problem, it introduces the combination problem and its efforts to account for it are simply unsatisfactory and feel forced and incoherent. For these reasons, I am far less optimistic about dualism, panpsychism and the illusionist theories within physicalism.
Alternatively, I think the physicalist and idealist groups of theories are the most likely to yield the best understanding of consciousness in the future. The physicalist theories have the advantage of making testable predictions, and the evolutionary arguments within the physicalists theories are strong. Additionally, while the physicalist camp has a myriad of individual theories, and only a few were mentioned here, they are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that multiple physicalist theories could be compatible, each explaining a different aspect of the nature of consciousness.
Conscious realism and classical idealism also seem very plausible. Conscious realism can, in theory, overcome the combination problem, and has the advantage that its mathematical claims can eventually be tested. It is very possible that this framework will either be verified or ruled-out in the next decade.
Classical idealism's claim that we are part of something much greater with cosmic implications is appealing to most people, even if its lack of predictions make it difficult to verify. It appeals to the mystery of ultimate mind but does not explain how matter actually emanates from mind or how consciousness and intentionality exist in all their forms. This makes it a 'God of the gaps' theory, invoking the metaphysical in the only place science has not yet reached, while simultaneously suggesting that the mystery itself may be real.
I can also imagine a possibility where both physicalism and idealism may be true, not as mutually exclusive camps, but as different levels of reality: physicalism for how consciousness functions, idealism for why it exists. For instance, I think it is possible that classical idealism explains the deeper reality of a mind-like creator or universe but that physicalism explains how consciousness unfolds and interacts with the physical world. Additionally, I think conscious realism is very compatible with physicalist theories, but simply moves ultimate reality up a level to places we cannot access directly.
Whether consciousness and ultimate reality are eventually explained by idealism, physicalism or some combination of the two, it's clear that the hard problem is uniquely hard. While I am hopeful that we might see more significant progress in the theories of consciousness, both experimentally and conceptually, it is possible that the hard problem of consciousness will forever be unsolved. Regardless, I believe the pursuit of understanding fundamental reality is worthwhile and could provide vital clues to the meaning and purpose of existence.
1Anil Seth, Being You: A New Science of Consciousness (New York: Dutton, 2021), 19.
2Philip Goff, Why? The Purpose of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 65.
3Seth, Being You, 181, 188.
4John R. Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness (New York: The New York Review of Books, 1997), 101.
5Goff, Why?, 67.
6Goff, Why?, 65.
7David Bentley Hart, All Things Are Full of Gods: The Mysteries of Mind and Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2024), 65.
8Bernardo Kastrup, "Analytic Idealism: A Consciousness-Only Ontology" (PhD diss., Radboud University Nijmegen, 2019), 9, https://philpapers.org/archive/KASAIA-3.pdf.
9Donald D. Hoffman, _The Case Against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2019), 236.
10Searle, Mystery of Consciousness, 124.
11Hart, All Things Are Full of Gods, 36-37.
12Hoffman, The Case Against Reality, 16-18.
13Hart, All Things Are Full of Gods, 356.
14Hart, All Things Are Full of Gods, 531-532.
15Seth, Being You, 23.